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Abstract: In today’s world society, constitutional 
theories converge in assigning an emerging 
role to legal forms of regulation not bound 
by national political systems and authorities. 
Several approaches try to grasp the diversity and 
multiplicity of layers, levels and stake-holders 
which constitute the post-national constellation of 
regulatory structures. One of the most prominent 
of these approaches is the idea of a transnational 
constitutional pluralism. This piece presents 
the framework of a plurality of transnational 
constitutional structures as conceived by authors 
like Gunther Teubner, to critically address the 
possibility of a global constitutionalization of law 
based on post-democratic structures in different 
domains of social regulation. In the end, the piece 
argues that, although pluralist approaches offer a 
useful description of current relations between 
law and power on the transnational level, there 
are functional limits to the constitutional claim 
emerging from the pluralist approaches. Such 
limits are, most importantly, pluralist approaches’ 
incapability of offering democratic mechanisms of 
legitimization for decision-making processes.
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Resumo: Uma miríade de novas teorias cons-
titucionais converge em atribuir um papel 
emergente para as formas de regulação so-
cial não submetidas aos sistemas políticos e 
autoridades dos Estados nacionais. Diversas 
abordagens tentam entender a diversidade e 
a multiplicidade de camadas, níveis e atores 
que constituem a constelação pós-nacional 
das estruturas regulatórias. Uma das propos-
tas teóricas mais proeminentes é a ideia de um 
constitucionalismo pluralista transnacional 
de Gunther Teubner. Este artigo apresenta a 
proposta de Teubner e propõe uma crítica do 
conceito de constitucionalização para além 
do Estado. Ao final, o artigo argumenta que, 
embora a abordagem pluralista de Teubner 
ofereça uma descrição interessante sobre as 
relações entre poder e direito no nível transna-
cional, há limites funcionais à sua pretensão de 
que essas constituições sejam equivalentes e 
funcionais das constituições políticas.
Palavras-chave: Gunther Teubner. Constitu-
tional Pluralism. Globalization. Transnational 
Legal Orders.
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1 Introduction: transnational constitutional questions 
There is an evident paradigmatic shift in contemporary 
constitutional theory. The proliferation of transnational – and global1 – 
legal regimes beyond the territorial boundaries of national constitutional 
frames has already shaped a new legal and political theoretical vocabulary 
that acknowledges the evolving dynamics of normative orders beyond the 
state (KENNEDY, 2009; KJAER, 2014; NEVES, 2013; PREUSS, 2010; 
SAND, 2013; SHAFFER, 2016; TEUBNER, 2012; WALKER, 2008). 
These normative structures can barely be described with the semantics of 
national constitutionalism, and even less by the tradition of classic public 
international law (SOMEK, 2012; WALKER, 2013). 
In this context, different authors, in the legal field and beyond, 
have been trying to make use of constitutional language to describe new 
forms of ruling (BLACK, 1996; FISCHER-LESCANO, 2007; HOLMES, 
2013; KJAER, 2014; MÖLLER, 2015; NEVES, 2013; PRIEN, 2010; 
RENNER, 2011; TRACHTMAN, 2006; WAI, 2005; WALKER, 2002). 
Some of these theories claim that evolving regimes of global and 
transnational governance may develop social structures that resemble the 
constitutional structures of modern democratic arrangements based on 
public law (RENNER, 2011; TEUBNER, 2004; WILLKE, 2003). Thus, 
as quasi-functional equivalents of democratic constitutional structures, 
they foster an increasing responsiveness of the ruling structures of global 
governance towards the demands of affected subjects (TEUBNER, 2009, 
p. 21; TEUBNER, 2012, p. 119-23). Problems of social inclusion and 
rights violations could thus become the focus inside regimes triggering 
active “constitutional processes” of institutional creativity and social 
improvement of governance mechanisms.
In this piece, I will address the challenge of theoretically 
conceiving the changing landscape of global constitutional theory 
following the theoretical thread of transnational constitutional pluralism 
as it has been proposed by different authors, but mainly as formulated 
1 Realizado com apoio do Centre for Global Cooperation Research (Käte Hamburg 
Kolleg), Duisburg, Alemanha.
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by Gunther Teubner (TEUBNER, 2004; 2010; 2012). I take Teubner’s 
argumentative thread mainly because it is an outstanding theoretical 
endeavor to understand the evolving forms of global governance through 
constitutional language. Moreover, it offers enlightening legal empirical 
insights that have been partially confirmed by interdisciplinary research. 
Nevertheless, I believe that some aspects of Teubner’s description have 
shortcomings. These limitations are not only his limitations, but perhaps 
the limits of the attempt of conceiving democracy beyond the nation 
state. By insisting on the idea that there are “transnational constitutions” 
as a sort of functional equivalent to democratic (national) constitutions, 
transnational constitutional pluralism seems to miss some important 
features of the evolving forms of global social ordering, which make 
them radically different from the forms shaped by modern (national) 
constitutionalism. 
After presenting the basic assumptions of a theory of transnational 
constitutional pluralism and its claims about the promotion of 
responsiveness within transnational governance, I will address some 
crucial differences between transnational governance and political forms 
of constitutionalization. 
2 The Transnationalization of Law and Power: a pluralistic 
world order
Different sectors of modern society have always had their own 
internal constitutive process of normativity. The modern market economy, 
for instance, has always depended on some normative definitions directly 
evolving from the economic practices not only to exist but also to affirm 
itself as a relatively autonomous sphere of social interaction (becoming 
eventually subject to external “political regulation”) (RENNER, 2011, p. 
40-41). These were the classical concepts of private law, such as freedom 
of contract, property or prohibition of unjust enrichment (GORDLEY, 
2006, 25-31; RENNER, 2011, p. 40-41). Similarly, modern science 
could only advance relying on normative expectations such as the idea 
of academic freedom, that existed within the European universities long 
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before their complete acceptance by the structures of political power, 
thereby becoming a fundamental right in many constitutional regimes 
(STICHWEH, 2013, p. 295-315). And the same can be said of other social 
sectors, such as sports, arts, health, transports, mass communication and 
even (romantic) love. 
This phenomenon has only been aggravated by the 
transnationalization of social life, specially through the driving force 
of the globalization of organizations, which began to operate beyond 
and beneath the territorial lines of the state-based political system 
(WILLKE, 2003, p. 80-90).2 In this increasingly a-topical world society, 
social integration must rely more on rapid and flexible communication 
media such as money, scientific knowledge and corresponding forms of 
soft law than on the hierarchical and territorially defined structures of 
state authority (TEUBNER, 2012, p. 1-21; WILLKE, 2001, p. 123-44). 
Consequently, in the last decades, non-state (societal) actors have begun to 
work side by side with international, supranational and national political 
organizations – made up by states – in the task of global social ordering. 
And since legality has gradually become an artifact of transnational 
social life (ABBOTT et al., 2000; HALLIDAY, 2009), we must also 
conceive the structures that regulate the production of law beyond the 
state. The strong thesis underlying the idea of an emerging transnational 
constitutionalism states the following: “the constitution of world society” 
would emerge “incrementally in the constitutionalisation of a multiplicity 
of autonomous sub-systems of world society”, it would thus assume the 
form of a “multiplicity of civil constitutions” (TEUBNER, 2004, p. 8). 
As understood by Teubner and other observers of transnational 
legal pluralism, the concept of legal constitutions must be decoupled from 
its political roots and extended to the global realm, where not only states, 
but also private, hybrid and semi-public actors constitute normative 
orders endowed with “authority”3 and operating as constitutionalizing 
2 For this point, see: Ahrne e Brunsson (2006), Meyer (2000), Stichweh (2003) e Willke 
(2003, p. 80-90.
3 On the idea of private authority (CUTLER, 2002; HALL; BIERSTEKER, 2002). And 
critical of the public/private distinction for describing global governance (SAND, 2013; 
ZUMBANSEN, 2010).
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self-contained regimes (WALKER, 2002). Alongside the still existing 
national constitutions and the mainly public global constitutionalism of 
international and supranational organizations such as the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World 
Bank, the United Nations (UN), the Organization of the American 
States (OAS), the European Union (EU) and the African Union (AU), 
there would be constitutional orders emerging from the social sectors 
of economy, science, culture, technology, mass media and also from 
transnational corporations and organizations (such as universities, NGOs, 
etc.) (TEUBNER, 2012, p. 42-58). 
Sure, transnational constitutional pluralism seems to push the 
concept of constitution too far. And it has been criticized for that. 
By extending the concept of constitution to any legal arrangement 
invested of some autonomous intent (such as the lex sportiva or the lex 
mercatoria), one runs the risk of being unable to tell what a constitution is 
at all (VESTING, 2009). The concept may turn useless, since it becomes 
tantamount to any idea of order, no matter how contingent this order might 
be. A corporation, an association, a family or even a group of friends can 
be said to have a constitution. Moreover, societal constitutionalism breaks 
down the distinction between public and private law, conceiving of legal 
norms as a social construct emerging from the spontaneity of social 
life and understands constitutions as a social “civil” phenomenon, thus 
offering no clear equivalent to ideas such as ‘common good’ or ‘public 
interest’ (MÖLLERS, 2004). There are for sure constitutional problems 
on the global and transnational levels, such as rights violations perpetrated 
by transnational actors or legitimation problems regarding transnational 
regulation. But the existence of “typical constitutional problems” could 
be insufficient to authorize the discourse about constitutions (NEVES, 
2013, p. 2).
There are notwithstanding also some good arguments for making 
the case for a transnational constitutionalism “in the making”. Indeed, 
there is a clear spreading of legal or quasi-legal forms of regulation on the 
global and transnational level that cannot be described with the concepts 
of classic state-based legal theory. Besides the international regimes of 
states, which have gone through a strong process of legalization since 
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the late 1980s (ABBOTT, et al., 2000), there is a new set of regimes 
emerging from specific policy domains, where the states, whose legal 
orders are often confronted, remain only one kind of actors among others. 
Commercial and investment arbitration, internet courts or sports courts are 
good examples where one can find a prolific case law challenging state 
jurisdiction (NEVES, 2013, p. 118-36). Also regimes that were initially 
based on the international law of the states developed an increasing 
process of reflexive and autonomous legalization, with their own rules of 
adjudication, courts and case law (HALLIDAY, 2009, p. 282-285). 
In fact, remembering a long legal-sociological tradition which 
reaches from Weber to Habermas and from Durkheim to Luhmann, we 
must bear in mind that the emergence of legal constitutions can only be 
understood as a consequence of the differentiation of law as a recursive 
system (LUHMANN, 1990, p. 184-93).4 Legal recursivity means that, in 
modern society, law can only be produced and reproduced by the means 
of law itself (LUHMANN, 2004, p. 105-20). In other words, there are no 
criteria to decide about the “legality” of a legal norm besides another legal 
norm. Accordingly, legality must be evaluated only in the face of legal 
norms, whose legality can also only be decided on the basis of further 
legal norms. This self-referent circle of “recursive legal validity” may 
become problematic, since there are in principle no legal norms endowed 
with intrinsic legality (a last resort of foundation).5 And in a complex, 
highly individualized and differentiated society, it would be very unlikely 
– to say the least – that one could ground legality on common moral or 
religious beliefs, without running the risk of breaking down the authority 
of the whole legal system. 
Despite this paradox, the law does not collapse. Indeed, in the 
course of modern legal evolution, the legal system was provided with an 
interesting way to deal with its logical self-implosion; namely, through the 
4? ????? ?? ????????? ????????????? ???? ?????????????? ???? ?????? ????? ???? ??????????????? ???
???? ?????? ??????? ??? ?? ?????????? ???? ???????????????????????? ????????? ????????? ?????????
dimension of the legal system (HABERMAS, 1984, 243-72).
5? ????????????????????? ???? ??????? ??????????????? ??????? ???????????????????????????????
of “founding legal rules”, such as the Grundnorm, the “State of Exception” or the “rules 
of recognition”. 
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emergence of a second level of recursive legality, which became known as 
“constitutionality”. So, besides the “basic legal rules” directed to human 
behavior, there are second level rules – established as a reflexive level of 
recursivity, namely reflexivity – able to decide whether a law is lawful 
(constitutional) or unlawful (unconstitutional) for the legal system itself 
(LUHMANN, 1990, p. 2.004). Of course, the problem of the paradoxical 
recursivity of the law does not disappear so easy, being only transferred 
to the level constitutional norms. Are there, for example, unconstitutional 
constitutional norms? How does one decide on the constitutionality of 
the constitution? On this level, however, the problem is “outsourced” to 
a further social structure. The question about the legality of constitutional 
norms is shifted to the political system, where it ceases to be seen as a 
“legal problem” and is converted into a legitimization problem.6 
3 Transnational Constitutions: concepts, problems, structures
The question whether we should (or not) name these structures 
as “constitutions” may be of theoretical value. And I will attempt to 
address this question later in this article. More important, however, is 
the analysis of the transnational processes of production of power, law 
and regulation as they effectively take place. By means of a careful 
analysis of these structural processes, the question of how to “name” the 
production of social norms within transnational governance can be largely 
de-dramatized. Certainly, there are no “transnational constitutions” in 
the literal sense; and any use of the term would depend on a strong re-
specification. As I understand, though, it may help to use a constitutional 
vocabulary at least as an attempt to grasp how power and authority 
are produced on this level, since “constitutions” deal exactly with the 
legitimate relationship between power and regulation. 
According to Teubner, if we want to talk about some sort of 
transnational process of constitutionalization, some conditions must be 
6 The problem of the “legal” or “political” character of the constitution made a long career in 
constitutional theory in the formulation of authors like Lassalle, Schmitt, Kelsen and Hart etc., 
reaching until our days.
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met. Firstly, (i) a theory of transnational constitutional pluralism must 
explain whether and how transnational legal regimes develop their own 
level of reflexive recursivity (reflexivity). Second, (ii) it has to clarify 
how these normative orders deal with the problems of “legitimacy” 
(FISCHER-LESCANO, 2007, p. 102-106). In his theoretical endeavor, 
Teubner attempts to address both problems.
(i) If the national constitutions were based on a relationship 
between the political system and the law that solved the foundational 
problem of the legal system, the “constitutions of the transnational” result 
from the heteronomous reference between the law and the autonomous 
social sectors and their processes of reproduction, which may have some 
equivalent characteristics. As societal constitutions, they are defined as a 
“structural coupling between the reflexive mechanisms of the law (that is, 
secondary legal norm creation in which norms are applied to norms) and 
the reflexive mechanisms of the social sector concerned” (TEUBNER, 
2012, p. 105). Although in very different and varied intensities 
and according to their specific conditions, transnational regimes 
are increasingly producing norms for regulating the identification, 
establishment and modification of norms as well as of competences for 
issuing and delegating primary norms that are essential for the generality 
and predictability of decision making processes (WALKER, 2002, p. 527-
529). From the standpoint of the law, the emerging partial constitutions 
consist of the production of legal norms structuring the self-reflection of a 
social sphere. They are legitimated through the benefits brought to society 
by the specific social dynamics being regulated. From the standpoint of 
the social sphere, its constitution consists of a normative self-reflection, 
in legal language, which is an unavoidable condition for its stable self-
reproduction (TEUBNER, 2004, p. 20; TEUBNER, 2012, p. 106). 
Accordingly, societal international and transnational orders produce 
their own version of the meta-code constitutional/unconstitutional, 
building specific forms of intern normative hierarchy. These internal rules 
become the basic criteria deciding on how to decide on the primary rules 
of the regime. Again, looking at the instance of economic governance 
regimes, the basic norms of the market economy, such as the freedom of 
contract, fundamental rights of corporations, the protection of property 
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rights and of competitive mechanisms, but also rules regarding the social 
obligations of property, corporate social responsibility and ecological 
sustainability may become the rules materially informing the decisions 
on the “legality” of primary norms in concrete cases (TEUBNER, 2012, 
p. 112-113). And the organizational rules, the rules of adjudication, may 
vary depending on how these regimes formalize. They all present however 
different levels of legalization, different functions for the professionals 
performing regulatory and adjucating functions and different relationships 
to relevant stakeholders. 
(ii) The constitutionalization of international and transnational 
regimes would express the fact that globalization sets free other 
social dynamics besides the political community as constituting legal 
mechanisms. According to Teubner, “not just politics, but other social 
systems, too, establish themselves through self-referential processes 
by which, ex nihilo, they constitute their own autonomy” (TEUBNER, 
2012, p. 65). Drawing on assumptions of social systems theory, the 
author points out that it is a mistake to understand constitutional 
structures as the expression of a collective identity that would found 
the legal system. Instead, he claims that the pouvoir constituent should 
be sought at the communication processes that constitute the social life, 
a sort of “communicative power” understood as an impersonal process 
of societal reproduction (TEUBNER, 2012, p. 63). The modern national 
legal system makes reference to the operational structures of the political 
system to hide its own self-foundation, just as the political system needs 
constitutional legal norms to hide the fact that the “real people”, in fact, 
never really wrote any constitution (maybe being even created by it). As 
formulated by Müller, in a constitutional democracy, the “people” (Volk) 
becomes a “constitutional people” (MÜLLER, 1997). 
The lack of a substantial people, a constitutional community, 
must therefore not be a problem, since it has been not less problematic 
in national constitutionalism. In fact, as put by Hans Lindahl (2007), 
the “self” acting as a self-constitutional people is not given before the 
constitutional process. Rather, it “can only be established retrospectively, 
from within the unity of a legal order: political unity does not admit 
of a pre-legal existential judgement” (LINDAHL, 2007, p. 20). The 
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constituent power does not emanate from a pure decision, it can only 
exist as it produces the processes to which it itself reacts: it is a result of 
the mediation between the legally produced politics and the law that is 
also procedurally constituted. Hence, the collective self of the constituent 
power “exists in the modes of questionability and, by way of its acts, of 
responsiveness” (LINDAHL, 2007, p. 21). 
4 Transnational Constitutionalism and Power: producing 
legitimacy without politics?
Referring to Koskenniemi, Teubner remembers however that on the 
transnational level the foundation and legitimization of normative orders 
do not seem to happen through the principles of “public” (political) 
international law, but
[t]hrough specialization – that is to say, through the creation of 
special regimes of knowledge and expertise in areas such as ‘trade 
law’, ‘human rights law’, ‘environmental law’, ‘security law’, 
‘international criminal law’, ‘European law’, and so on – the world 
of legal practice is being sliced up in institutional projects that 
cater for special audiences with special interests and special ethos. 
(KOSKENNIEMI, 2009, p. 9)
The politics of transnational law becomes more and more a problem 
of deciding according to which rules a specific case will be decided and 
by whom (KOSKENNIEMI, 2009, p. 12-14). If under the structures of 
national politics it was possible for one constitutional court to decide 
according to the principles and rules of one and only normative order 
in case of a collision of rights, it seems that on the transnational level 
different courts and regimes have different takes on the same issue.7 The 
“fragmented constitutional subjects” of the world society therefore face a 
crucial challenge: the quest for the responsiveness of their transnational 
7? ?????????????????????????????? ?? ??????????????????????????????????? ????????
2004; NEVES, 2013).
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constitutional processes to a complex social environment with which 
society itself can barely cope. 
In fact, the stubborn reproduction of modern social processes is 
an old concern within the social sciences. Classic authors as distinct as 
Karl Marx, Emile Durkheim, Karl Polanyi and Max Weber used different 
concepts (such as alienation, anomia, disembedment or the iron cage) 
to describe the destructive effects of the modern expansive reproduction 
of self-referent blind social spheres such as the market economy, law, 
science or technology over the human, social and natural environments. 
Indeed, modern political constitutions, with their all-encompassing bills 
of rights, can also be understood as a self-protection of society against the 
expansive tendencies of the political (LUHMANN, 1965) and, later, the 
economic system (POLANYI, 1944, p. 210-218). 
If these tendencies have been relatively tamed through the means 
of legal constitutionalization of the political system, how could this 
process be reproduced on the global level, where the emergence of 
a world state is not more than a – maybe dystopian – distant idea? In 
this context, the “blind stubbornness” of self-reflective social sectors is 
further strengthened, since they are organized as self-contained regimes, 
describing social conflicts through their own respective lenses. 
International sports arbitration, for instance, looks at social conflicts 
through the lens of the competitive standards of sportive practices, for 
which competitive equality is a major value, sometimes disregarding 
other rights, such as the freedom of profession, that could be also taken 
into account in hard cases by constitutional courts.8 The same happens 
8 In a controversial case, the Union Cyclist Internationale (UCI) decided, after a positive 
??????? ??? ??????? ?????? ???? ???? ?????????? ??? ?? ???????? ???????? ??? ???? ??????? ????????
competition. The athlete contested the decision before national sports authorities, 
????? ?????? ??? ??????? ??? ???? ???????? ?????????????? ????? ??????????? ???????? ?????????
on grounds of due process and protection of fundamental rights, forcing the Spanish 
Cycling Association to allow the claimant to take part in national competitions. The 
UCI then appealed to the Court for Arbitration of Sports (CAS), which sustained the 
original UCI decision, arguing that only international authorities of sports could legally 
manage their competitions, since they would treat all athletes equally, not leaving room 
for local variations regarding regulations on doping, what would make impossible equal 
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in other areas, such as investment arbitration, where decisions are made 
on the basis of the principle of “fair and equal treatment of investors” 
and “security of investments”, or commercial arbitration, where decisions 
are made always taking into account the basic principle of freedom 
of contract (also regarding the freedom to choose the forum and the 
applicable law)9. 
These regimes can nevertheless internalize through their own 
language social demands coming from a “public” or from other social 
sectors. Legally, it can be done, for instance, through the existing 
doctrines of the “horizontal effects of fundamental rights”, which 
claim that human rights are not only addressed to states, but also to 
private actors (TEUBNER, 2006). Examples can be found in the field 
of economic governance (e.g. corporate social responsibility and 
sustainable governance), in the scientific system (bioethics) etc. The 
argument goes that any attempt to address the critical questions regarding 
the responsiveness of post-national global regimes towards their 
social, human and natural environment must arise from these regimes 
themselves, namely through their processes of constitutionalization 
(TEUBNER, 2012, p. 86-88). 
Social responsiveness does not fall from heaven. For Teubner, it 
depends on the social dynamics steering the constitutionalization process, 
which emerges from the “internal differentiation” of governance regimes 
“into an organized-professional sphere and a spontaneous sphere” of 
social actors and operations reproducing the regulated social sphere 
(TEUBNER, 2004, p. 27; TEUBNER, 2012, p. 89). 
On the transnational level, the spontaneous sector corresponds to 
the public of individuals and organizations that are somehow affected by 
regulatory decisions or depend on the benefits of a certain social sphere 
conditions of competition in the world sports. Indeed, if the Spanish National Cycling 
Association would comply with the decision of Spanish Courts, it would run the risk of 
excluding all Spanish athletes of any international competition. For this and many other 
cases, see NEGOCIO (2014).
9 For an extensive and careful research of case law in private arbitration, see RENNER 
(2011).
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(such as world finance or world high education), but do not perform 
any direct function in the regulation of the sector’s reproduction. Taking 
commercial transnational governance as an example, one can understand 
as part of the spontaneous sector every individual who depends on the 
goods provided by transnational corporations, the employees working 
across the diversified – and unequal – production chains, communities 
whose natural environment may be affected by the processes of 
production and circulation of goods, NGOs fighting the consequences 
of corporate operations through shaming processes or through social 
mobilization. 
The organized sectors of transnational (and global) governance 
regimes consist of the actors that directly manage the decision-making 
processes, be it the setting of rules, adjudication, or the more informal 
processes of supervision, the mechanisms of compliance and production 
of regulatory knowledge. Given the heterogeneity and polycentricity of 
governance structures, this participation may assume very specific forms, 
varying in intensity and in quality. It may be related, for example, to the 
production of indicators, a very powerful instrument for governance in 
some areas (such as human rights), which is often seen as the role of 
experts in some central organizations like the OECD, the World Bank or 
the UN.10 It can assume the form of standard setting procedures for the 
exercise of a key profession by a private non-profit organization (such as 
accounting standards) or other sorts of standard setting (BOTZEM, 2008; 
PETERS; KOECHLIN; ZINKERNAGEL, 2009). It may still be the 
meta-regulation of public or private regulators through some membership 
structure of a transnational organization, such as certification associations 
(CAFAGGI, 2016). These managing individuals can also participate in 
loose informal networks setting advisory rules that are then internalized 
by public or private actors, through policy diffusion or institutional 
isomorphism. Or it can assume the form of more rigid legally structured 
participation. 
Since actors often appear in more than one regime, sometimes also 
shifting from one to another in pursue of their interests (keyword forum 
10 For an overview of the use of indicators in global governance, see DAVIS et al., (2012)
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shopping), the positions as part of the regulatory “organized” core of a 
constitutional arrangement or as part of its spontaneous social periphery 
may also change over time. These regimes may also change their 
constitutive rules for membership, what makes it difficult to identify a 
rigid and definitive distinction between a constituency and a government 
in the complexity of transnational governance. In fact, as pointed out by 
Claus Offe, the idea of governance seems at times to blur – or at least 
make invisible – the power relations between the governed and the 
governing authorities (OFFE, 2009, p. 551). 
Central for the management of transnational regulation, on the 
“organized” side of regime operations, is the production of knowledge 
(DRORI; MEYER, 2006; MERRY, 2011). As a consequence of the 
difficulty of coordinating social action without the support of an 
overarching central authority, there seems to be a shift in the processes of 
regulation, which has been also observed within states (BLACK, 1996; 
2001). Rigid normative expectations imposed by a hierarchical authority 
seems to be replaced, or at least mixed, with forms of flexible adaption 
and cognitive learning (LUHMANN, 2004, p. 464-469; TEUBNER, 
2012, p. 94). Accordingly, the central actors of a specific regime may 
adapt their reciprocal expectations according to changes in perceptions 
and beliefs about how the future behavior of the social sector will evolve. 
Moreover, the complexity of regime pluralism makes difficult any kind of 
harmonization of expectations, often forcing states and non-state actors 
to make use of very specialized knowledge in trying to cope with such 
complexity (ALTER; MEUNIER, 2009, p. 18-19). This may undoubtedly 
empower the position of experts and specialized professionals. And the 
struggle over “governance authority” often assumes the form of a struggle 
for “epistemic authority” in a given issue area (QUACK, 2016, p. 364-
366). 
For Teubner, any form of approximate comparison between the 
transnational processes of constitutional formation and the idea of 
“democratization” depends thus on a contingent balance that may (or may 
not) take place within this “dualism of a formally organized rationality” 
(the equivalent of formally organized parties and state administrative 
structures) and the “informal spontaneity“ of society (that could be 
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compared to the electorate, interest groups and public opinion in general) 
(TEUBNER, 2004, p. 27). This balance would mean that none of the two 
sectors could affirm a primacy vis-à-vis the other. “Societal constitutions 
ought therefore to direct their attention towards safeguarding the 
internal politicization of the spontaneous sphere against the dominance 
of the organized professionalized sphere” (TEUBNER, 2012, p. 91). 
And transnational constitutionalization would imply the establishment 
of mechanisms, by which the spontaneous sector could constrain the 
organized sector formed by decision-makers, judges, arbiters, experts, 
lawyers and professionals to become responsive to the social, human and 
natural environment of the fragmented domain of social life they would 
be responsible to regulate (TEUBNER, 2015). 
This can be made through different mechanisms, such as protest 
social movements that could re-politicize regulatory processes making 
it more sensitive to exclusionary problems created by the regime 
reproduction. Teubner identifies important developments in this direction 
in phenomena like naming and shaming initiatives, by which social 
movements denounce bad practices of transnational corporations; in 
whistleblowers that trigger global processes of scandalization by releasing 
information that otherwise would never become public; in organizations 
like Wikileaks which force access to information about corrupt and 
unethical practices and the increasing networks of NGOs specialized 
in protesting transnational governance (TEUBNER, 2012, p. 89-92; 
TEUBNER, 2015, p. 75-76). One may think moreover of the increasing 
reorientation of NGOs and think tanks for the production of alternative 
knowledge to dispute the processes of regulation within the regimes 
through the contestation of expert domination (QUACK, 2016, p. 374-
376). Importantly, any process of irritation of these “constitutionalizing” 
regimes has to take place in their own language, since they can either 
learn from the observation of changing expectations in their environment 
or be destroyed by their lack of adaptability and capacity to coordinate 
action. (TEUBNER, 2012, p. 94-96). The transnational constitutional 
moments assume thus the form of a cognitive learning process, often 
carried out by experts acting as surrogates of social groups whose 
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demands are translated to the theoretical specialized language of the 
respective governance regimes.11 
5 Constitutionalization without Democracy? The Functional 
Limits of Post-Political Constitutionalism
As I understand, it is not so relevant to discuss whether Teubner’s 
(and others’) insistence in using the terminology of transnational 
constitutions, constitutionalism or transnational democracy is really 
justified (GRIMM, 2009; NEVES, 2013; VESTING, 2009). For me, it is 
clear that calling “constitutions” the institutional arrangements evolving 
around transnational regimes can only be understood as metaphoric 
exercise, making sense only as theoretical reflection. Notwithstanding, 
stating that “there is no constitution of the transnational” may be 
absolutely right. But it can be not much more than a comfortable 
observation by those who – feeling like semantic sentinels of the good old 
traditions – do not want to admit that things have really changed when it 
comes to the exercise of power and authority in a transnationalized world 
society. Traditionalist semantical caution does not really change the facts 
being observed.
Moreover, the use of old names for describing new phenomena is 
not problematic in itself. Indeed, the term democracy as used in modern 
societies, although based in Ancient Greek terminology, is highly unlikely 
to bare much familiarity with its original Athenian meaning.12 By the 
way, French and American revolutionaries used many old concepts 
– such as constitution, republic, democracy – to name radically new 
11 There has been an interesting debate over the concept of “recursivity” in the sociological 
institutionalist tradition that has many points of convergence with this argument. In this 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????
mechanisms of these processes. See, for example, Malets e Quack (2017).
12 For the simple fact that the Ancient Greek political system was based on ontological 
????????????? ??????????? ????????? ?????? ??? ?????? ???????? ??????? ??? ???? ?? ?????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
about how to decide on an open future concerning every citizen, but how to preserve the 
glory of the past. For this point, see KOSELLECK (1972).
Seqüência (Florianópolis), n. 82, p. 61-91, ago. 2019 77
Pablo Holmes
institutions, just because they lacked better options as they tried to make 
sense of the events they were witnessing. The fundamental problem may 
lie rather in the structural differences between diverse social processes. 
A sociologically sensitive comparison may easily show not only these 
differences, but can also raise some hypothesis about how they might 
unfold. 
Accordingly, the “constitutional” structures of transnational 
governance may produce new forms of reproduction of law and power 
in the world society of our days, diverging in important ways of the 
democratic arrangement of political constitutionalism. Here lies one of 
the important limitations of the pluralist approach. Although it surely 
identifies important factual developments in the functioning of law and 
regulation in a transnationalizing world society, it sometimes seems 
to miss the point, promising a positive scenario for a future that can be 
not much more than illusory; perhaps a rich phantasy inspired by the 
creativity of its own theoretical efforts. 
First, one needs to remember that normative political inclusion 
was, indeed, a structural condition for the arrangement between law and 
politics within modern constitutionalism, relying on strong expectations 
towards decision-making procedures based on inclusionary suffrage. For 
modern politics, each individual is normatively equal when it comes to 
the exercise of power (LUHMANN 2000, p. 90-95; THORNHILL, 2011, 
p. 153-157). 
The constitutionalization of the political system means, on the 
one hand, that power as a social medium assumes a legal form and its 
social reproduction depends on its legalized circulation according to the 
procedures of the constitutional system. On the other hand, law becomes 
dependent on the differentiation of the political system for its own 
reproduction (LUHMANN, 1990): the last foundation of the law receives 
constitutional form as a kind of special law given for the people by the 
people (GRIMM, 2010, p. 9). Indeed, the legal form can only achieve 
a relative level of autonomy via-a-vis other social processes (such as 
religion or economy) – thus making law the only way to produce new 
law –, if power has been legally bound to processes of constitutional 
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reproduction, namely electoral, legislative and judicial procedures. 
Otherwise, legal rules may be exposed to exploitations by particularistic 
conjunctions of interests and status. Corrupt law – and by that I mean 
law reproduced on the basis of particularistic conjunctions of power or 
interests – remains actually a latent possibility as shown in empirical 
circumstances of extreme social exclusion (NEVES, 1999; 2007; 2017).
This process of differentiation and establishment of reciprocal 
dependency institutionalizes a self-legitimization dynamic according 
to which political power has to produce its own means for acquiring 
authority. Public authority must result from a functional political 
“provision of the social capacity of binding collective decision-making” 
(LUHMANN, 2000, p. 93) and not from external sources such as religious 
beliefs or morality. Moreover, the process of constitutionalization, where 
and if it comes about, sets free an expansive inclusionary pressure, since 
any kind of political exclusion must be justified under grounds that 
are increasingly unlikely to be accepted (THORNHILL, 2011, p. 168-
180). This does not mean that modern political constitutionalism is a 
necessarily egalitarian system. In fact, there are many forms of political 
exclusion in the constitutionalized states of the Global North, which are 
barely compatible with the social structures of political constitutionalism. 
One may only think of the political exclusion of individuals who were 
born and socialized in some Western European democracies and have no 
voting rights. Yet, the differentiation of a political system triggers profuse 
processes of politicization that may work as inclusionary pressures. 
One might remember here the long (and still ongoing) politicization of 
sexual, gender and racial inequalities as well as in the access to economic 
resources. These struggles have given place to new forms of social 
inclusion that, in turn, have been integrated in many constitutional orders 
according to a well-known narrative about “the expansion of citizenship” 
(MARSHALL, 1950, p. 27-75). 
Differently as it is in the case of normative democratic theories, a 
functional sociology of the political system cannot understand political 
inclusion as a normative demand of associated free individuals seeking 
to express their common collective will. The collectivity that is the 
addressee of political decisions cannot be understood as having any form 
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of pre-political existence (NASSEHI, 2003, p. 149). Rather it must be 
created by the very concrete inclusive (electoral, legislative and judicial) 
procedures they claim to access in a constitutional system (LUHMANN, 
1983, p. 27-32). And if these procedures are absent, structural political 
exclusion (and inequality) will be inevitable, giving place to further forms 
of social exclusion in a cumulative process. Accordingly, it is not hard 
to think how powerful elites may claim to be the direct representative of 
the whole collectivity, replacing inclusive constitutional procedures by 
processes of constitutionalization that are weak or have only symbolic 
character. This is the reason why a political philosopher like Claude 
Lefort wrote that, in a political democracy, “the locus of power becomes 
an empty place” and “the exercise of power is subject to procedures of 
periodical redistribution” (LEFORT, 1988b, p. 19). For him, any kind 
of paralyzation or restriction of these procedures will always have 
exclusionary implications, since it invisibilizes the production of the 
social collectivity as a contingent process and, therefore, the contingent 
reproduction of power, which can thus become available to private 
appropriation. As Lefort puts it, “inequality and invisibility [of power] go 
hand in hand” (LEFORT, 1988a, p. 51). 
Along these lines, we may summarize our functional comparison 
with the following questions: How do the “constitutional” structures and 
processes of transnational governance perform their functions? And what 
are the differences between them and the social structures of political 
constitutionalism? 
6 Conclusion
For sure, many transnational governance regimes have developed 
structures of deliberation that may improve inclusion and participation 
(MALETS; QUACK, 2017). Yet, there are structural functional 
differences that rely on their high specialization and which have 
consequences for their mechanisms of “political inclusion”. Only 
those that internally count as “voters” may have access to the decision-
making processes. And these are, per definition, only those who have 
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sufficient knowledge of the specialized language to engage in meaningful 
deliberative processes. Even social movements organized by affected 
individuals can often only make sense of their condition with the help 
of transnational alliances with experts, NGOs or think tanks, which often 
use their knowledge to perform transnational advocacy and mobilization. 
One further problem concerns the fact that transnational governance 
regimes have different relative capacities of social reproduction and 
enforcement of their regulations (NEVES, 2009). This is because they 
must derive their “social strength” from the social area they are cast to 
regulate. Thus, the economic governance of investment is certainly 
more robust than some regional human rights regimes or regulatory 
dynamics of health and environmental protection. This is a consequence 
of structural asymmetries between the possibilities of action available 
to the organizations of some functional systems (such as transnational 
corporations, transnational accounting firms or even universities) vis-
à-vis individuals, indigenous communities, health or environmental 
activists. Indeed, money is easier to move and reproduce than normative 
expectations.13 This makes transversal forms of responsiveness 
between different regimes more unlikely, while also making difficult 
the politicization of a conflict by communities that are often not used 
to understand social problems according to the specialized regulatory 
languages in play. A conflict regarding the destructive consequences 
of massive economic investments to the livelihood of indigenous 
populations in Ecuador may be problematized with small chance of 
victory in the Ecuadorian domestic constitutional system or at the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights. These communities can barely 
reach out of the circle of allies consisting of human rights activists and 
environmentalists in order to translate a right claim into a language that 
economic actors “understand” and through political action that could 
13 In the language of systems theory, one could say that, while the reproduction of the 
economic system relies basically on its code (money), politics and “democratic law” 
??????????????? ????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
reproduction. It makes them dependent on very unlikely processes of coordination of 
expectations, what makes them also quite weak forms of communication in the face of 
processes of societal transnationalization. 
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hurt their profitability (such as economic boycotts by consumers or legal 
action by public prosecutors in the global north). 
Empirical research has nevertheless provided convincing evidence 
that regulatory rules and the (constitutional) rules regulating the decision-
making processes can be adapted and altered according to demands 
coming from the disorganized periphery of the regimes (MALETS; 
QUACK, 2017) engaged in processes of contestation. This would 
resemble “transnational constitutional moments”, when transnational 
regimes can learn how to become more inclusive and responsive to their 
social and human environment. 
Transnational contestation may assume the form of social 
mobilization as rooted in national civil societies, now adapted through the 
building of transnational alliances and other mechanisms of transversal 
mobilization across and beyond territorial borders (KECK; SIKKINK, 
1999, p. 1-38). This strategies may work well in some areas that are 
more international such as trade negotiations, where nation-states play 
a prominent role (BÜLOW, 2010, p. 67-80). The reason is that states 
remain largely sensitive to usual forms of political protest coming from 
their own national public spheres. This network may then produce the so-
called boomerang effect, by which an advocacy network force a particular 
nation state to observe rights claims as a consequence of international 
pressure activated through transnational alliances (KECK; SIKKINK, 
1999, p. 12-13). Yet, this kind of mobilization often reproduces the 
asymmetries of resources in favor of the organizations of richer states, 
which may shape the mobilization networks and internationally frame the 
conflicts according to their own views and interests (BÜLOW, 2010, p. 
193-196). Moreover, states responses in the international arena also vary 
across international inequalities of political and economic power, what 
can further strengthen existing hegemonic geopolitical relations. 
A different kind of contestation takes place in governance regimes 
where state actors are less important. It often assumes the form of a 
struggle over epistemic authority about the correct descriptions of 
regulatory problems and challenges faced by the regime. Counter-
hegemonic actors can thus use “scientific and professional knowledge 
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as a resource for counter-claims and public comparisons”, which may 
enhance the possibilities of resource-poor actors to reframe certain 
problems within a given regime (QUACK, 2016, p. 375). Here, new 
descriptions of the subject matter or new hegemonic epistemological 
conceptions of how to organize available knowledge for professionals 
may reshape the functioning of a specific regime. Disputes over how to 
conceive corporate accounting rules or how to conceive of corruption in 
transnational arbitration of investment contract disputes can gain whole 
new meanings depending on how they are described. 
It is not difficult to notice the structural differences between 
the constitutional form of political democracy and the transnational 
structures of governance when it comes to the processes of shaping and 
changing societal normative structures. In every way possible, the high 
fragmentation and specialization of transnational governance regimes 
favors the accumulation of power and formation of social asymmetries 
that can be only indirectly bypassed by outsiders. This might contribute 
to the formation of transnational networks of highly included individuals 
and groups that, despite their best intentions, might have only very limited 
cognitive capacity to produce internal responsiveness to those who are 
in remote social environment of these structures. As pointed out by 
sociological research, social inclusion and social exclusion often develop 
a cumulative dynamic. Those who are excluded from one functional 
system of modern society often run the risk of being excluded of further 
social systems (NASSEHI, 1999; NEVES, 1999; 2017). The one who 
has no valid ID or residence permit might lose access to the formal job 
market. Without a formal job, she might have less or no money; and 
without money, no access to education, health care etc. 
Active social inclusion through the welfare state has been the 
result of intense processes of politicization within modern political 
structures of constitutionalization. Another cycle, a vicious one, may 
also occur as a consequence of selective social exclusion: selective 
and exclusive inclusion in the transnational economic system may 
lead to the accumulation of power, rights and knowledge. And it might 
become difficult to realize that an easy and direct access to the processes 
of regulatory decision-making is the result of the accumulation of 
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inclusionary chances. If society misses the constitutional mechanisms for 
the factual inclusion in decision-making processes (at least as members 
of a political community with voting rights) or the means for making 
sense of experiences of individual or collective suffering as a trigger to 
organized political action with constitutional intent, there might be some 
structural changes in the way it reproduces itself on the transnational 
level. Power might become increasingly invisible, such as its relations to 
the reproduction of inequalities. And networks of transnational inclusion 
may arise as the invisible rulers over politically excluded transnational 
masses that have only very limited ways to access the processes that 
regulate their lives.
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